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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Bergen County Prosecutor demoted and later fired 
one of his investigators allegedly for his r ole in an 
investigation of fellow law enforcement officers. The 
principal issue on appeal is whether the investigator's 
 
dismissal violated his First Amendment rights. Holding the 
prosecutor's interest in an efficient workplace outweighed 
the investigator's interest in his speech, the District Court 
granted summary judgment for the prosecutor and related 
state entities on the First Amendment claim and declined 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his r emaining 
state law claim.1 For reasons that follow, we will reverse in 
part, affirm in part, vacate in part, and r emand.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 42 
U.S.C. SS 1983, 1988, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state 
claims under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 because the District Court order disposed of all federal claims. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. Latessa v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1317 (3d Cir. 
1997). In conducting our review, we view the r ecord in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable 
inferences in his favor. Fogarty v. Boles, 121 F.3d 886, 887 (3d Cir. 
1997); Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(en banc). This court must make an " `independent constitutional 
judgment on the facts of the case' " as to whether the speech involved is 
constitutionally protected. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 n.10 
(1983) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (opinion of 
Brennan, J.)); Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 891 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
2. The District Court also held that plaintif f 's suit under New Jersey's 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act waived all other related state law 
claims. We will affirm. 
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I. 
 
FACTS 
 
In 1983, Mark Baldassare commenced working at the 
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office as an agent; in 1984 he 
was promoted to investigator; and in 1989 he was promoted 
to Lieutenant of Investigators and Director of the Computer 
Division.3 Over the years, Baldassare received several 
promotions culminating in his appointment in January 
1995 as Acting Chief of Investigators by the Ber gen County 
Prosecutor, John Fahy. 
 
The incident that sets the stage for this lawsuit took 
place in 1994 when allegations of criminal activity began to 
circulate within the Bergen County Pr osecutor's Office. At a 
disciplinary hearing of Senior Investigator Richar d Barbato, 
his attorney accused Deputy Chief Ed Denning and 
Lieutenant Mike Carlino of a "car scam"--buying previously 
leased county vehicles well below market price. Baldassare 
reported these allegations to First Executive Assistant 
Robert Hennessey and Prosecutor Fahy, who later 
instructed Baldassare to ascertain whether the cars owned 
by Denning and Carlino had been previously leased by the 
County. After determining the vehicle identification 
numbers matched, Prosecutor Fahy instructed Baldassare 
to perform an internal investigation into the allegations 
against Denning and Carlino. At its conclusion, Pr osecutor 
Fahy decided Denning and Carlino should be char ged 
criminally and authorized a complaint. Because of a conflict 
of interest, Prosecutor Fahy turned the matter over to the 
New Jersey Attorney General. But after investigating, the 
Attorney General's Criminal Division dismissed the charges 
for lack of evidence of criminal intent.4  Despite the Attorney 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
For this reason, we will present Baldassar e's version of the events 
leading up to his dismissal. 
 
4. In a memo on the Denning and Carlino matter , a New Jersey Deputy 
Attorney General concluded: 
 
       Upon a thorough review of all available evidence in this matter, 
       including over 30 witness interviews, analysis offiles and 
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General's decision, Prosecutor Fahy brought administrative 
charges of wrongdoing against Denning and Carlino. As a 
result, both were suspended without pay. Denning chose to 
retire. 
 
On February 28, 1995, Deputy Attorney General Charles 
Buckley questioned Baldassare about his r ole in the 
Denning and Carlino investigation. Buckley allegedly told 
Baldassare that Denning and Carlino wer e friends and that 
criminal charges should not have been pursued. He then 
allegedly asked Baldassare to name all those involved in the 
investigation, noting his unhappiness that "two good men's 
careers had been ruined." 
 
The following day, Prosecutor Fahy resigned and Buckley 
became Acting Prosecutor for Bergen County. Baldassare 
contends it soon became clear that Buckley held him 
responsible for the officers' punishment, and began 
engaging in "rude, disrespectful and r etaliatory conduct." 
 
Buckley subsequently demoted Baldassare two levels 
from Acting Chief of Investigators to Captain; transferred 
him to the Bergen County Police Academy; and prohibited 
him from further contact with the Bergen County 
Prosecutor's Office Computer Division which he previously 
managed. Baldassare also contends Buckley sear ched for 
evidence that would cast him in an unfavorable light. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       documents produced by Bergen County, the BCPO and BCNTF, 
       ALCO, and GMAC and particularly in light of the internal 
       procedures existing at BCPO and BCNTF , it is respectfully 
       recommended that this office decline pr osecution in this matter 
       based upon the lack of criminal intent sufficient for a successful 
       prosecution. 
 
       As set forth above the theft and misconduct char ges are not 
       supported by the evidence. . . . It is further r ecommended that a 
       more appropriate remedy for the defendants' actions be to refer 
this 
       matter for any and all administrative action that the BCPO would 
       deem appropriate. 
 
Memorandum from Frank J. Brady, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, 
Corruption/Antitrust Division to Terrence P. Farley, Director, and 
Michael Bozza, Deputy Director, Department of Law and Public Safety for 
the State of New Jersey's Division of Criminal Justice (October 24, 1994). 
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matter came to a head, Baldassare charges, when Buckley 
terminated him with neither notice nor cause on October 
10, 1995. 
 
Buckley maintains that after assuming office as Acting 
Prosecutor, he realized Baldassar e was not qualified to 
serve as Acting Chief of Investigators. Buckley's defense 
details Baldassare's dearth of qualifications and errors, 
which include making false accusations, mishandling a 
murder and an organized crime investigation, and 
attempting to cover-up the improper discharge of his 
firearm. Moreover, Buckley insists that Baldassare was 
insubordinate and exhibited an unhelpful attitude. For 
these reasons--and not for retaliatory purposes--Buckley 
professes he demoted Baldassare fr om Acting Chief of 
Investigators to Captain and assigned him to the Police 
Academy in June 1995. When Baldassare purportedly failed 
to adjust his poor attitude and adequately per form his 
duties, Buckley fired him. 
 
II. 
 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Baldassare sued Buckley, Bergen County, the Bergen 
County Prosecutor's Office, the State of New Jersey and the 
County of Bergen Board of Chosen Fr eeholders under 42 
U.S.C. S 19835 for violating his procedural and substantive 
due process rights by "fail[ing] to allow him to exercise his 
freedom of speech in speaking out about various public 
issues and/or in exercising his role as Captain of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Title 42 U.S.C. S 1983 provides: 
 
       Every person who, under color of any statute, or dinance, 
regulation, 
       custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
       Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
       United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the 
       deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
       Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
       action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress 
       . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
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County Prosecutor's Office when he investigated and 
reported other officers for their violation of the law and 
public policy." Baldassare also brought state law claims-- 
breaches of contract, violation of New Jersey's 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act ("CEP A"), N.J. Stat. 
Ann. SS 34:19-1 to -8, and violations of the New Jersey 
Constitution. 
 
Defendants filed motions to dismiss. The District Court 
dismissed Baldassare's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
due process claims and his CEPA claim against the State of 
New Jersey on sovereign immunity grounds. After 
discovery, the District Court granted defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law CEPA violation. Baldassare 
appeals the grant of summary judgment on his claims 
brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for violation of his First 
Amendment rights, tortious violation of his state 
constitutional right to freedom of speech, and tortious 
interference of economic advantage. 
 
III. 
 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
A public employee has a constitutional right to speak on 
matters of public concern without fear of r etaliation. Rankin 
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84 (1987); Feldman v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 1994) ("A state 
cannot lawfully discharge an employee for r easons that 
infringe upon that employee's constitutionally pr otected 
interest in freedom of speech."). Public employers cannot 
silence their employees simply because they disappr ove of 
the content of their speech. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384; 
Watters, 55 F.3d at 891. While"the government's role as 
employer . . . gives it a freer hand in r egulating the speech 
of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the 
public at large," this hand cannot act with impunity. Waters 
v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion); 
Watters, 55 F.3d at 895-96. 
 
A public employee's retaliation claim for engaging in 
protected activity must be evaluated under a three-step 
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process. Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth. , 105 F.3d 882, 885 (3d 
Cir. 1997); Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 
1996). First, plaintiff must establish the activity in question 
was protected. Holder v. City of Allentown , 987 F.2d 188, 
194 (3d Cir. 1993). For this purpose, the speech must 
involve a matter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 
147; Watters, 55 F.3d at 892. Once this threshold is met, 
plaintiff must demonstrate his interest in the speech 
outweighs the state's countervailing interest as an employer 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it provides 
through its employees. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968) (requiring courts to strike"a balance 
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it perfor ms through its 
employees"); Azzaro, 110 F.3d at 976; Green, 105 F.3d at 
885. These determinations are questions of law for the 
court. Waters, 511 U.S. at 668; Green, 105 F.3d at 885. 
 
If these criteria are established, plaintif f must then show 
the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor 
in the alleged retaliatory action. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Watters, 55 
F.3d at 892; Swineford v. Snyder County Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 
1270 (3d Cir. 1994). Lastly, the public employer can rebut 
the claim by demonstrating "it would have r eached the 
same decision . . . even in the absence of the pr otected 
conduct." Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287; Swineford, 15 F.3d at 
1270 (citing Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F .2d 98, 103 (3d 
Cir. 1983)). The second and third stages of this analysis 
present questions for the fact finder and ar e not subject to 
review in this case. Green, 105 F.3d at 889 (recognizing 
second and third steps in Pickering/Mt. Healthy analysis 
are questions for fact finder); see also Watters, 55 F.3d at 
892 n.3; Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 79 n.6, 80 (3d 
Cir.) (noting whether protected activity acted as substantial 
or motivating factor in discharge and whether same action 
would have been taken regardless ar e questions for jury), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988); Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 
776 F.2d 443, 454 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding "second and third 
questions . . . should be submitted to the jury"). 
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A. 
 
MATTER OF PUBLIC C ONCERN 
 
Our initial inquiry trains on whether Baldassar e's 
conduct in the investigation qualifies as a matter of public 
concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Swineford, 15 F.3d at 
1270-71. "A public employee's speech involves a matter of 
public concern if it can `be fairly considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social or other concer n to the 
community.' " Green, 105 F .3d at 885-86 (quoting Connick, 
461 U.S. at 146). In this respect, we focus on the content, 
form, and context of the activity in question. Connick, 461 
U.S. at 147-48; Watters, 55 F .3d at 892. The content of the 
speech may involve a matter of public concer n if it attempts 
"to bring to light actual or potential wr ongdoing or breach 
of public trust on the part of government officials." Holder, 
987 F.2d at 195 (internal quotations and citation omitted); 
see also Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1271 ("[S]peech disclosing 
public officials' misfeasance is protected."). The District 
Court ruled that Baldassare's conduct in the investigation 
constituted a matter of public concern. W e agree. 
 
In Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F .3d 823 (3d Cir. 
1995), we recognized the compilation and distribution of a 
public auditor's report involved matters of public concern. 
The plaintiff, James Feldman, worked as the director of the 
Philadelphia Housing Authority's Internal Audit Department 
where he was responsible for unearthing and investigating 
corruption, fraud and illegality. As part of his duties, 
Feldman was required to share hisfindings with the 
agency's executive director and board of commissioners. 
When Feldman prepared a critical r eport aimed at 
improprieties in certain personnel decisions by the 
executive director and chairman of the board of 
commissioners, the executive director fir ed him before the 
report could be circulated. Alleging he was fired in 
retaliation for protected speech, Feldman brought suit 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and Pennsylvania's"whistleblower" 
statute. We found his report satisfied the threshold 
requirement because "[t]he very purpose of his auditing 
reports was to ferret out and highlight any improprieties 
that he found at [the Pennsylvania Housing Authority]. 
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Disclosing corruption, fraud and illegality in a government 
agency is a matter of significant public concer n." Feldman, 
43 F.3d at 829. 
 
It seems likely the scope of Baldassare's duties as a 
general investigator was broader than Feldman's. But the 
underlying issue is similar, namely, whether Baldassare's 
role in an internal investigation of alleged criminal 
wrongdoing by officials in the Bergen County Prosecutor's 
Office implicates First Amendment protection. 
 
Defendants contend Baldassare perfor med his internal 
investigation of Officers Denning and Carlino in the normal 
course of his duties as an investigator at the instruction of 
Prosecutor Fahy. Because the report was pr epared as part 
of Baldassare's employment, defendants ar gue it does not 
satisfy the "matter of public concern" r equirement. In 
support, they rely on a decision by the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit which held statements made in a 
police accident report and related deposition did not 
constitute speech on a matter of public concer n. Morris v. 
Crow, 142 F.3d 1379 (11th Cir . 1998). Analyzing police 
reports in relation to matters of public concern, the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated: 
 
       Police reports reflect information of general public 
       interest and any information concer ning police conduct 
       and public safety could be considered to r each matters 
       of public interest. The fact that such infor mation may 
       be of general interest to the public, however , does not 
       alone make it of "public concern" for First Amendment 
       purposes. 
 
Morris, 142 F.3d at 1381. 
 
We believe the comparison is inapt. In Morris, the court 
found the officer's report of a car accident and subsequent 
testimony did not constitute a public matter because the 
expression did not evince an attempt "to bring to light 
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on 
the part of government officials." Morris, 142 F.3d at 1382 
(citation and quotation omitted). Moreover , the court noted 
that the officer's professional duties r equired him to provide 
the information. It is undisputed that Baldassare was also 
required to perform his investigation. But even under the 
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Morris rationale, Baldassare's investigation would still 
constitute a matter of public concern because it attempted 
to expose " `specific wrongs and abuses within the county 
government.' " Morris, 142 F.3d at 1382 (quoting Warnockv. 
Pecos County, 116 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir . 1997)). Our 
jurisprudence makes clear that an internal investigation 
into the alleged criminal actions of public employees "falls 
squarely within the core public speech delineated in 
Connick." Swineford, 15 F .3d at 1271 (internal quotations 
and citation omitted); but see Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 
239 F.3d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Speech which is made 
in all respects as part of the employee's job duties is 
generally not the protected expression of the public 
employee."). 
 
Defendants also stress the internal natur e of the 
investigation counsels against finding Baldassar e's conduct 
involves a public matter. But the inter nal character of the 
investigation is not necessarily significant, because our 
inquiry focuses on the nature of the infor mation, not its 
audience. We have recognized that 
 
       the community's interest in the free exchange of 
       information and ideas relating to matters of public 
       concern is not limited to public declarations. That 
       interest is implicated in [internal] exchanges . . . as 
       well as in exchanges between an individual and 
       members of the public. [Internal] dissemination of 
       information and ideas can be as important to effective 
       self-governance as public speeches. Thus, if the 
       content and circumstances of a[n] [internal] 
       communication are such that the message conveyed 
       would be relevant to the process of self-governance if 
       disseminated to the community, that communication is 
       public concern speech, even though it occurr ed in a 
       private context. 
 
Azzaro, 110 F.3d at 977-78 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 
146, 148); see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387 n.11 ("The 
private nature of the statement does not . . . vitiate the 
status of the statement as addressing a matter of public 
concern.") (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 
U.S. 410, 414-16 (1979)). It appears, therefor e, we have 
declined to distinguish between a public employee's 
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expression "as an employee" and a public employee's 
expression "as a citizen." Azzar o, 110 F.3d at 979. Instead, 
we concentrate on the value of the speech itself. 
 
In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), an assistant 
district attorney circulated a questionnaire in her office "to 
gather ammunition for another round of contr oversy with 
her superiors" in an effort to oppose a transfer. 461 U.S. at 
148. Despite her personal motivation to derail her transfer, 
the questionnaire satisfied this threshold requirement 
because one question addressing pressur e to work in 
political campaigns raised a matter of public concer n. 
Likewise, Baldassare's motive for perfor ming the 
investigation is immaterial. 
 
Baldassare's investigation sought " `to bring to light 
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust' " 
by the officers he investigated. Holder, 987 F.2d at 195 
(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148). "Needless to say, 
allegations of corrupt practices by government officials are 
of the utmost public concern." O'Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 
F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1989). For these reasons, we hold 
Baldassare's conduct and expression in the internal 
investigation of employees at the Bergen County 
Prosecutor's Office constituted a matter of public concern. 
 
B. 
 
BALANCING OF INTERESTS 
 
We next turn to whether Baldassar e's free speech interest 
in his investigation is outweighed by any injury his conduct 
could cause the interests of the prosecutor as a public 
employer. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Green, 105 F.3d at 
887. In striking this balance, the public's inter est in the 
expression may be significant. O'Donnell , 875 F.2d at 1061. 
The public employer, furthermor e, bears the burden of 
justifying the discharge, which " `varies depending upon the 
nature of the employee's expression.' " Watters, 55 F.3d at 
895 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 150). Above all, no single 
factor involved in this balancing is dispositive; they are all 
" `weights on the scales.' " Zamboni, 847 F.2d at 79 (quoting 
Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 107). 
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On the employee's side of this balance, the public's 
interest in exposing potential wrongdoing by public 
employees is especially powerful. We have made clear that 
"[s]peech involving government impr opriety occupies the 
highest rung of First Amendment protection. Mor eover, the 
public's substantial interest in unearthing governmental 
improprieties requires courts to foster legitimate 
whistleblowing." Swineford, 15 F .3d at 1274; see also 
Feldman, 43 F.3d at 829 ("The inter ests of [the auditor], as 
well as the public, in exposing governmental wrongdoing 
. . . [are] very strong."); O'Donnell, 875 F.2d at 1062 ("The 
public has a significant interest in encouraging legitimate 
whistleblowing . . . ."). 
 
Defendants suggest that Baldassare's conduct utterly 
destroyed "a needed close working relationship" with the 
chief prosecutor. Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 106; see also 
Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977). Because the r elationship 
between prosecutor and investigator demands trust and 
confidence, they argue, its wholesale disruption deprives 
Baldassare's expression of constitutional protection. With 
respect to the employer, we must consider "whether the 
[expression] impairs discipline by superiors or harmony 
among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close 
working relationships for which personal loyalty and 
confidence are necessary, or impedes the per formance of 
the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation 
of the enterprise." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; O'Donnell, 875 
F.2d at 1061. In calibrating the significance of the 
disruption, the relationship between the employer and the 
employee is particularly important. Sprague, 546 F.2d at 
564. Specifically, we must look to the "[p]roximity within an 
organizational hierarchy [a]s a significant factor in the 
employer's demonstration that a public employee's speech 
had a detrimental impact on a necessarily close working 
relationship." Swineford, 15 F .3d at 1272-73 (holding 
county voter registrar's interest in comments regarding 
electoral improprieties did not outweigh the state's interest 
in efficiency when discharged); see also Zamboni, 847 F.2d 
at 79 (holding court must determine "whether 
[investigator's] functional role in the prosecutor's office was 
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of such proximity to [his employer] that his speech 
destroyed a needed close working relationship"). 
 
In this vein, defendants argue Baldassar e was terminated 
because his professional relationship with Buckley had 
completely deteriorated as a result of his r ole in the 
investigation. Citing Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 
565 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), 
defendants contend the categorical disruption of a close 
working relationship effected by an employee's conduct is 
unprotected as a matter of law. In Sprague , the District 
Attorney of Philadelphia, F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, fired his 
First Assistant, Richard Sprague, after he sharply criticized 
the truth of public statements made by the District 
Attorney. In a criminal prosecution, First Assistant Sprague 
had been seeking a sentencing recommendation of two and 
a half to five years for a convicted criminal, Joseph 
Nardello. Subsequently, the District Attor ney intervened 
and recommended probation at Nardello's sentencing 
hearing. It was later discovered the District Attorney had 
previously represented Nardello's co-defendant and his 
motives for the recommendation were questioned. In several 
public declarations, the District Attorney maintained his 
office suggested the recommendation and/or a sentencing 
agreement had been made with Nardello by the previous 
District Attorney. When Sprague challenged the veracity of 
these public comments in an interview published in The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, he was fir ed. 
 
In weighing the relevant interests, we found "[t]he crucial 
variant in [the Pickering] balance appears to have been the 
hierarchical proximity of the criticizing employee to the 
person or body criticized." Sprague, 546 F.2d at 564. 
Although we held Sprague's comments touched on 
important issues that fell within the purview of the First 
Amendment, the Pickering balance did not"tilt" in his favor 
because "the effectiveness of the employment relationship 
between employee-speaker and employer-tar get [was] so 
completely undermined." Id. at 565. 
 
We find the reliance on Sprague  misplaced. Sprague 
voluntarily criticized and publicly admonished his employer 
for whom he acted as an "alter ego." W e found his actions 
completely destroyed a working relationship that was 
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dependent on mutual trust and confidence.6 Baldassare's 
demotion from Acting Chief Investigator to Captain and 
subsequent transfer to the police academy belie a 
comparison to the undoing of a "close working r elationship" 
in Sprague.7 Moreover, Baldassare was directed to perform 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We rested this conclusion on guidance we drew from the Supreme 
Court's earlier holding in Pickering. In Pickering, the Court held a high 
school teacher could not be dismissed for criticizing a school board's 
handling of financial issues in a letter to a local newspaper. In its 
opinion the Court presaged the questions raised in Sprague when it 
recognized that Pickering's 
 
       statements [were] in no way directed towards any person with whom 
       [he] would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work 
as 
       a teacher. Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by 
       immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers is presented 
       here. [Pickering's] employment relationships with the Board and, to 
       a somewhat lesser extent, with the superintendent ar e not the kind 
       of close working relationships for which it can persuasively be 
       claimed that personal loyalty and confidence ar e necessary to 
their 
       proper functioning. 
 
       * * * 
 
       It is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment 
in 
       which the need for confidentiality is so gr eat that even 
completely 
       correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for 
       dismissal. Likewise, positions in public employment in which the 
       relationship between superior and subor dinate is of such a 
personal 
       and intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism of the 
       superior by the subordinate would seriously undermine the 
       effectiveness of the working relationship between them can also be 
       imagined. 
 
391 U.S. at 569-70, 570 n.3. 
 
On this basis, we found that despite the "grave public import" of 
Sprague's comments, the Pickering balance leaned in the public 
employer's direction because "the ef fectiveness of the employment 
relationship between employee-speaker and employee-target [was] so 
completely undermined." Sprague, 546 F.2d at 565. "Indeed, the public 
uproar engendered by Sprague's pronouncements is precisely the factor 
that so thoroughly curtailed Sprague's usefulness as Fitzpatrick's 
deputy." Id. 
 
7. Defendants also point out that under New Jersey law, investigators 
serve at the pleasure of the prosecutor . N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:157-10 
(West 2000); Cetrulo v. Byrne, 157 A.2d 297, 300-01 (N.J. 1960). 
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the investigation by his employer, Pr osecutor Fahy, and he 
did not impugn the integrity of his superior . See id.; see 
also Roseman v. Ind. Univ. of Pa. at Ind., 520 F .2d 1364, 
1368 (3d Cir. 1975) (upholding dismissal of First 
Amendment claim when speaker's expression "called into 
question the integrity of the person immediately in charge 
of running a department"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 
(1976). A similar relationship is not at issue here. 
 
There is little doubt that Baldassare's investigation 
threatened to undermine the effectiveness of the 
prosecutor's office based on the "potential disruptiveness of 
the speech." Waters, 511 U.S. at 680. Furthermore, there is 
no doubt that Baldassare's role in the investigation 
impaired his working relationship with Buckley. 
Nonetheless, we have long recognized: 
 
       The First Amendment balancing test [of Pickering] can 
       hardly be controlled by a finding that disruption did [or 
       could] occur. An employee who . . . exposes . . . 
       corruption in her office no doubt may disrupt and 
       demoralize much of the office. But it would be absurd 
       to hold that the First Amendment generally authorizes 
       . . . officials to punish subordinates who blow the 
       whistle simply because the speech somewhat disrupted 
       the office . . . . The point is simply that the balancing 
       test articulated in Pickering is truly a balancing test, 
       with office disruption or breached confidences being 
       only weights on the scales. 
 
O'Donnell, 875 F.2d at 1062 (quoting Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 
107 (emphasis in original)); see also Feldman , 43 F.3d at 
830 ("Exposing waste, fraud, and corruption within an 
agency will likely cause disruption, particularly when done 
by a person whose responsibility it is to unveil such 
conduct. This type of disruption however, cannot justify a 
retaliatory charge."). Under this view, Baldassare cannot be 
faulted in the Pickering analysis for disruption caused by 
an internal investigation into fellow officers. 
 
Therefore, we hold that Baldassare's expression in his 
investigation is constitutionally protected. Because there is 
a strong public interest in uncovering wr ongdoing by public 
employees, his investigation involved a matter of public 
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concern. Because we find that Baldassar e's conduct 
involved a matter of significant public concer n and the 
state has failed to establish its interest outweighed its 
employee's, we find the District Court err ed in holding the 
expression was not protected by the First Amendment. 
Accordingly, we will reverse and r emand this matter to the 
District Court. 
 
C. 
 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
 
There remain disputed issues as to the r easons for 
Baldassare's dismissal. If the fact finder concludes that 
Baldassare was discharged for his involvement in the 
investigation, defendants still have an opportunity to 
demonstrate they would have followed the same course of 
action.8 On remand, Baldassare bears the burden of 
establishing his protected conduct in his investigation of 
Denning and Carlino served as a substantial or motivating 
factor in his dismissal. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287; Feldman, 43 
F.3d at 829. Defendants can rebut this claim if they can 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence Baldassare 
was terminated for other reasons. W atters, 55 F.3d at 892 
(citing Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Supreme Court ensured public employers would have this 
protection when it recognized: 
 
       A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment 
       question resolved against him because of constitutionally protected 
       conduct. But the same candidate ought not be able, by engaging in 
       such conduct, to prevent his employer fr om assessing his 
       performance record and reaching a decision . . . [to terminatehis 
       employment] on the basis of that recor d, simply because the 
       protected conduct makes the employer mor e certain of the 
       correctness of its decision. 
 
Doyle, 429 U.S. at 286. 
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IV. 
 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
 
Defendants insist they are immune under the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 
(1982). The District Court mentioned this defense 
approvingly in its oral decision. But it r emains unavailing. 
Defendants assert that Baldassare's First Amendment 
rights against retaliation were not clearly established at the 
time Buckley chose to discharge him, citing Sprague, 546 
F.2d 560, and Hooper v. Nacrelli , 512 F.Supp. 363 (E.D.Pa. 
1981) (dismissing police chief 's complaint alleging 
infringement of his First Amendment rights when mayor 
demoted him). As noted, Sprague does not control the 
expression at issue. Defendants' argument that 
Baldassare's First Amendment rights wer e not clearly 
established cannot be sustained. See, e.g., Green v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882 (3d Cir . 1997) (holding voluntary 
court appearance by police officer constituted matter of 
public concern); Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886 
(3d Cir. 1995) (holding police department could not dismiss 
employee for criticizing departmental program in newspaper 
article); Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823 (3d Cir. 
1995) (holding housing authority could not dismiss public 
auditor for report detailing wrongdoing by housing 
authority officials); Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 
188 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding city could not terminate city 
employee for criticizing public employment r esidency 
requirement in local newspaper); O'Donnell v. Yanchulis, 
875 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding township could not 
dismiss police chief for protected speech); Czurlanis v. 
Albanese, 721 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding county 
unlawfully discharged county mechanic for criticizing his 
department at public meetings). Some years ago, we 
recognized that "as of 1982 the law was`clearly established' 
that a public employee could not be demoted in r etaliation 
for exercising his rights under the first amendment." 
Zamboni, 847 F.2d at 80 n.7 (inter nal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
 
Our decision rests solely on the protected status of 
Baldassare's conduct during his internal investigation. We 
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express no opinion as to any issue left for adjudication. In 
particular, we render no opinion on Baldassare's 
competency.9 Our holding is limited to whether an 
investigator's internal report of alleged wrongdoing by other 
officers is a matter of public concern that justifies First 
Amendment protection under the Pickering  balancing test. 
 
V. 
 
CEPA CLAIM 
 
The District Court held that Baldassare's initiation of a 
retaliation claim under New Jersey's Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act ("CEPA") ef fected a waiver of his 
other state law claims, which were based on identical facts. 
Of these claims, Baldassare only appeals the waiver of his 
claims alleging tortious violation of his state constitutional 
right to freedom of speech and tortious inter ference with 
economic advantage. We will affirm. 
 
We examine the state law claims in light of the statute's 
language and its interpretation by New Jersey courts. In 
1986, the New Jersey legislature enacted CEP A to protect 
public employees who "blow the whistle" on governmental 
organizations or employees engaged in wr ongful conduct 
from retaliatory action.10 Abbamont v. Piscataway Township 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The question of Baldassare's competency is one for the fact finder. 
Feldman, 43 F.3d at 831 (holding "[employer's] attack on [employee's] 
alleged incompetence as the reason for his dismissal raised a jury 
issue"). 
 
10. The category of actions provided by the statute includes: 
 
       An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an 
       employee because the employee does any of the following: 
 
       a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a 
public 
       body an activity, policy or practice of the employer or another 
       employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the 
       employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or 
       regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or , in the case of an 
       employee who is a licensed or certified health car e professional, 
       reasonably believes constitutes improper quality of patient care; 
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Bd. of Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 964 (N.J. 1994). As part of the 
statute, the state legislature included a waiver provision 
that provides: 
 
       Nothing in this act shall be deemed to diminish the 
       rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under 
       any other federal or State law or regulation or under 
       any collective bargaining agreement or employment 
       contract; except that the institution of an action in 
       accordance with this act shall be deemed a waiver of 
       the rights and remedies available under any other 
       contract, collective bargaining agreement, State law, 
       rule or regulation or under common law. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:19-8. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has interpr eted the scope 
of this waiver provision and concluded: 
 
       [O]nce a CEPA claim is "instituted," any rights or 
       claims for retaliatory discharge based on a contract of 
       employment; collective bargaining agreement; State 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body 
       conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation 
       of law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the 
       employer or another employer, with whom ther e is a business 
       relationship, or, in the case of an employee who is a licensed or 
       certified health care professional, pr ovides information to, or 
       testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, 
       hearing or inquiry into the quality of patient car e; or 
 
       c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or 
       practice which the employee reasonably believes: 
 
        (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or r egulation promulgated 
       pursuant to law or, if the employee is a licensed or certified 
       health care professional, constitutes impr oper quality of patient 
       care; 
 
        (2) is fraudulent or criminal; or 
 
        (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy 
       concerning the public health, safety or welfar e or protection of 
       the environment. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 34:19-3. 
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       law, whether its origin is in the Legislatur e, the courts, 
       the common law or rules of the court; or regulations or 
       decisions based on statutory authority, are all waived. 
       The waiver exception contains a list of sour ces of law 
       that may provide a bundle of rights protecting 
       employees from retaliatory dischar ge. Parallel claims 
       based on those rights, privileges and remedies are 
       waived because they represent multiple or duplicative 
       claims based on retaliatory discharge. 
 
Young v. Schering Corp., 660 A.2d 1153, 1160 (N.J. 1995). 
 
By contrast, the court found the waiver would not apply to 
"those causes of action that are substantially independent 
of the CEPA claim." Id. Because Baldassare's state law 
claims arise from the same set of facts surr ounding his 
retaliation claim, and CEPA prohibits litigating duplicative 
claims, we will affirm the order dismissing his other state 
law claims. 
 
The District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Baldassare's remaining CEPA claim since 
the dismissal of his First Amendment claim disposed of all 
federal issues.11 But given our reversal of the grant of 
summary of judgment on Baldassare's retaliation claim 
under the First Amendment, we will vacate the District 
Court's order declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over his CEPA claim. We express no opinion on 
whether the District Court should exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction in this matter. 
 
VI. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will r everse the judgment of 
the District Court regarding the First Amendment 
protection accorded the plaintiff 's investigatory conduct, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. This claim alleges the defendants violated CEPA by improperly 
punishing Baldassare in response to his r ole in the investigation of 
Officers Denning and Carlino and the charges subsequently brought 
against them. 
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vacate the court's order declining jurisdiction over his CEPA 
claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. We will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court dismissing Baldassare's other tort claims. 
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